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1. Introduction: The Theoretical Challenges of Minority Elections 
Neither the claim for autonomy by various regional and ethnic groups or the regional and 
minority autonomies, and in particular the European autonomy arrangements are a new 
phenomenon, nor have they been understudied. There exists an extensive literature regarding 
autonomies, including seminal works (see Benedikter, 2009; Ghai, 2000; Kántor, 2014; Salat 
et al., 2014; Suksi, 1998; Weller, Wolff, 2005; Woodman, Ghai, 2013) but the primary focus 
of the studies has been on the issues of territorial autonomies. Although, more recently, there 
has been an emerging literature on non-territorial autonomies (NTA, see Cordell, Smith, 
2008; Malloy, Osipov, Vizi, 2015; Malloy, Palermo, 2015; Nimni, 2005; Nimni, Osipov, 
Smith, 2013; Smith, Hiden, 2012), much less attention has been paid to this model of which – 
with its strong focus on individual participation – may be suitable for territorially dispersed 
minorities in particular. As an inevitable consequence of the dissolution of the former 
dynastic and multi-ethnic empires and communist multi-national federations, a considerable 
number of such minority communities live in Central and Eastern Europe despite the 
homogenization policies of the last century.  
Since this kind of autonomy aims to cover those who belong to a certain group irrespective of 
its place of residence and size, there needs to be at least one institution that unites and 
organizes members of the group (Szarka, 2004, 249) – an institution established in public or 
private law. In creating their autonomy frameworks several countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia, Ukraine), most prominently 
Russia, refer to the notion of NTA in their legislation and policies, and in public opinion this 
implies that special associations must be endowed with such public functions as maintaining 
educational and cultural institutions. In practice, this idea has been barely implemented in the 
Russian case (Osipov, 2010). Similarly, in Latvia, pursuant to the 1991 law on cultural 
autonomy, the so-called national societies have the right to develop their own educational 
institutions.2 Besides, since membership in an association is voluntary, such an approach 
immediately poses the question of legitimacy in at least two ways: for a voluntary 
organization it is more difficult to reach the less active and committed members of the group; 
further, the great number of associations might easily undermine the potential for the 
autonomous organizations to represent the minority in interactions with the state authorities 
(Brunner, Küpper, 2002, 27). 
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Other countries, namely Estonia, Hungary, and some of the former Yugoslav republics, 
namely Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia, represent a different model, whereby registered 
minority voters are granted the right to establish new types of institutions by direct or indirect 
elections. Elections are not only a major component of democratic political systems but they, 
furthermore, may play a key role in certain NTA arrangements, and they were central to the 
process of establishing non-territorial cultural autonomy for the Austro-Marxist theorists of 
NTA – both Otto Bauer (Bauer, 2000, 281) and Karl Renner as well (Renner, 2005, 26).  
The few findings that have been published regarding the non-territorial model in Central and 
Eastern Europe underscore the controversy between the continued dominance of the nation-
state model, the large extension of state control on minority issues and interethnic relations, 
and all those positive expectations that led to the spread of various NTA regimes in the 
region. Thus, they suggest that these institutional examples were more likely created top-
down in favour of imposing symbolic and apolitical, such as educational and cultural issues 
on minority groups, thereby preventing and neutralizing any potential territorial claims. This 
may be especially true for Roma, one of the largest ethnic groups in the region, especially if 
less effort is put in improving their socio-economic inclusion. Yet surprisingly little research 
has been devoted to assessing the extent to which these regimes meet minority demands, the 
findings by pointing out how the implementation and practice as well as the competences of 
these NTA organizations vary by state, emphasize also the need to support bottom-up 
activities and to strengthen democratic accountability and effective representation – such 
changes can be described as a shift to governance, too (see Osipov, 2010, 2013; Smith, 2010, 
2013). From the above they argue that there needs to be a closer look on practices, and that 
more research has to be done to explore how both minority members and minority 
representatives perceive and use their own, above described, autonomy organizations in 
everyday reality, as well as how they view themselves, their identities and their role within the 
organizations, particularly in the context of the unfinished nation- and state-building 
processes. This argumentation gives prominence to minority elections as a potential tool to 
identify and critically assess the intra-group dynamics. 
While a growing body of mostly Hungarian literature, predominantly from legal and 
sociological point of view, has examined the functioning of the NTA regime in Hungary, the 
so-called minority self-governments (MSGs), their capacities (see Bindorffer 2011; Csefkó, 
Pálné 1999; Kállai 2005; Váradi 2002), as well as the relevant legislation, the electoral rules 
and abuses (see for instance Győri Szabó 2006; Halász, Majtényi 2003; Magicz 2010), or elite 
dynamics (Tóth, Vékás 2011) other aspects of elections remain understudied (for the few 
exceptions, see Rátkai 2000, 2003). 
This is highly remarkable, especially when considering that all electoral systems, including 
the above NTA cases and their elections, in this respect, have to be both understood as 
political institutions, products of the political process, a complex set of structuring factors that 
provides opportunities and creates institutional barriers to alternatives (see Körösényi, 2009, 
41). Electoral systems and rules are per se not democratic and are in fact far from neutral; all 
of them have a political or social bias, favouring certain groups over others at a given time. 
The issue is particularly important, since many scholars have pointed out that choosing an 
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electoral system is not only about the electoral process, but also about competing normative 
values. As such, the decision is one of the most important in a democracy. It is not only about 
distinguishing or combining, and adopting majoritarian and proportional electoral formulas, 
but there seems to be an agreement that in every democratic political setting, the function of 
elections goes beyond simply filling posts with candidates, although the relevant literature 
usually emphasize only a few of them (see, for instance, Birch 2001; Dalton, Farrell, 
McAllister 2011; Frankenberger, Graf 2011; Harrop, Miller 1987; Hermet 1978; Horowitz 
2003; Katz 1997; Wojtasik 2013). Accordingly, elections, both in theory and practice, may 
fulfil various different functions, and these are highly context dependent, depending foremost 
on the regime type3, the nature of the elected body (collegial or singular character, level of 
elections, competences, resources etc.), and the adopted electoral formula, and the relative 
importance and impact of the potential functions may change over time and vary from one 
political setting to another, too (Wojtasik, 2013, 26).  
While there has been a consensus emerged throughout the 20th century regarding the minimal 
conditions under which general elections must take place in democracies, and both the 
institutional design and the policy consequences of electoral systems have been the dominant 
focus of comparative research, little is known about the role played by NTA elections in intra-
community relations of minorities. Moreover, the key guiding questions are whether and how 
the functions and logic of regular parliamentary and municipal elections can be 
conceptualized in these special minority contexts, which of the possible functions of elections 
make sense, take particular relevance at this level, in these minority elections, and whether 
and how the major findings of the electoral literature can be applied to these special 
configurations. To address the issues above, after a brief overview of the institutional aspects 
of the minority autonomy, the paper seeks to explore both theoretically and in practice, the 
general patterns of elections of the minority self-governments in Hungary, one of most 
prominent cases of the five countries concerned, and aims to contribute to the better 
understanding of the role of elections in minority contexts. It uses the major goals and 
functions of elections as analytical tools to assess whether and how the elections of the 
recognized minorities in Hungary perform these major functions and meet the requirements of 
democratic elections. In sum, it examines whether and how the main functions of elections – 
freedom of voters, competition, choice from alternatives, legitimacy and accountability, 
mobilization for participation – as well as the main features of the electoral system, the 
adopted electoral formula, can be conceptualized and understood in special minority elections. 
2. A Brief Overview of the Hungarian Model of NTA 
In addition to the aforementioned Baltic countries, Hungary with its 1993 law on the rights of 
national and ethnic minorities4 and the system of minority self-governments was one of the 
first and classic examples of NTA arrangements in the region following the fall of the 
communist regimes. A growing number of scholars, however, by focusing predominantly on 
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implementation, have accepted the argument that granting extended minority rights and non-
territorial autonomy for thirteen officially recognized minority groups have been especially 
motivated by the concern to set an example abroad and to put pressure on the neighbouring 
countries, having regard to the situation of the more numerous Hungarian minorities abroad. 
They tend to ignore some other explanatory factors behind the Hungarian model but they are 
right in pointing out that minorities generally have not been politically mobilized in large 
numbers along ethnic lines, the ethnic, almost exclusively Roma parties were, without 
exception, unsuccessful at the parliamentary elections. According to the latest census data, 
between 2001 and 2011, the percentage of persons belonging to the 13 officially recognized 
minorities grew from 5 percent to 6.5 percent of the population (ca. 650 thousands of people, 
see Table 1).  
Table 1: the censuses of 2001 and 2011 regarding national and ethnic minorities in 
Hungary5 
Minority Nationality 
(ethnicity) 
Native language Language used 
among friends, in 
family 
Affinity 
with 
cultural 
values, 
traditio
ns 
Persons 
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2001 2011 
Bulgarian 1,358 3,556 1,299 2,899 1,118 2,756 1,693 2,316 6,272 
Roma 189,984 308,957 48,438 54,339 53,323 61,143 129,259 205,720 315,583 
Greek 2,509 3,916 1,921 1,872 1,974 2,346 6,140 6,619 4,642 
Croat 15,597 23,561 14,326 13,716 14,788 16,053 19,715 25,730 26,774 
Polish 2,962 5,730 2,580 3,049 2,659 3,815 3,983 5,144 7,001 
German 62,105 131,951 33,774 38,248 53,040 95,661 88,416 120,344 185,696 
Armenian 620 3,293 294 444 300 496 836 1,165 3,571 
Romanian 7,995 26,345 8,482 13,886 8,215 17,983 9,162 14,781 35,641 
Ruthene 1,098 3,323 1,113 999 1,068 1,131 1,292 2,079 3,882 
Serb 3,816 7,210 3,388 3,078 4,186 5,713 5,279 7,350 10,038 
Slovak 17,693 29,647 11,817 9,888 18,057 16,266 26,631 39,266 35,208 
Slovene 3,025 2,385 3,180 1,723 3,119 1,745 3,442 4,832 2,820 
Ukrainian 5,070 5,633 4,885 3,384 4,519 3,245 4,779 7,393 7,396 
 
However, the fact alone that the estimated number is sometimes twice as high reveals the 
relatively high level of uncertainty surrounding minority identities in Hungary. Census results 
at first glance show a growing level of minority consciousness but others remain sceptical, 
due to the comparability of the two subsequent censuses, and particularly since the vast 
majority of them declared themselves to be Hungarian, too. So with the exception of Roma 
and Germans it is still questionable whether any kind of dissimilation in most of the cases 
could be observed. Minorities, furthermore, are mostly at an advanced stage of linguistic 
assimilation, clear-cut ethnic boundaries can be hardly defined. Several minorities have 
dominantly Hungarian-speaking subgroups (Roma6, Armenians), and the vague nature of 
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ethnic identities has often given rise to debates over the complexity of belongings and the so-
called “ethnobusiness”. In addition, minority communities live dispersed throughout the 
country: according to census data out of the almost 3200 municipalities ca. 2500 had minority 
inhabitants, and ca. only in 50 settlements they formed local majorities, and the even more 
considerable extent of growth of diasporas almost preclude any possibility of territorial 
autonomy arrangements. Over the past decades, since the first 1994 minority elections the 
quite complex structure of minority self-governments has gone under significant changes as a 
result of the 2005 overall amendment of the 1993 law and the new 2011 minority law7 (see 
Table 2).     
Table 2: Major elements of the Hungarian system of NTA 
 MSG elections in 1994, 
1995, 1998, and 2002 
MSG elections in 2006 
and 2010 
MSG elections from 
2014 
Personal 
scope of the 
law 
Freedom to choose 
identity 
 
 
Freedom to choose 
identity, registration 
Freedom to express 
identity, registration 
Minority definition and 
expandable lists of 13 
recognized minorities and 
their native languages 
Minority definition and 
expandable lists of 13 
recognized minorities and 
their native languages 
Minority definition and 
expandable lists of 13 
recognized minorities 
and their native 
languages 
Elections: every 
Hungarian voter, and de 
facto non-citizens 
Elections: minority 
Hungarian citizens, at least 
30 registered voters. 
Additional requirements 
for candidates 
Elections: registered 
minority Hungarian 
citizens and non-citizens 
(until 2019), at least 25 
persons (30 from 2024) 
according to census data. 
Additional requirements 
for candidates 
Local level Three forms of MSGs 
Direct, majority system, 
Block Vote 
One form 
Direct, majority system, 
Block Vote 
Two forms 
Direct, majority system, 
Block Vote 
Territorial 
level 
Only in Budapest 
Indirect, majority system, 
Block Vote 
Every county and 
Budapest 
Indirect, proportional, List 
PR, d’Hondt method 
Every county and 
Budapest 
Direct, proportional, List 
PR, d’Hondt method 
National level Indirect, majority system, 
Block Vote 
Indirect, proportional, List 
PR, d’Hondt method 
Direct, proportional, List 
PR, d’Hondt method 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Hungarian-speaking Romungro community, while less 20% of them speak either Romani or Beash. The latter, 
the smallest group refers to those who speak their own ancient Romanian dialect (see Marushiakova et al., 2001) 
and mostly in the South Western part of the country (about the various ethno-linguistic communities and their 
numerical changes, see Kemény, 2000).    
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Until 2006 the law distinguished three types of MSGs at local level, including the districts of 
the capital city. The most prevalent was the one that was directly elected through a 
majoritarian system in which voters had as many votes as there were candidates to be elected. 
The candidates with the highest vote totals won the seats. Similar electoral systems were 
chosen for both the territorial and national levels. However, creating legitimate, autonomous 
bodies within a NTA model has been closely associated with the challenging issue of defining 
community boundaries in Hungary. Whereas minorities originally refused any kind of 
registration of persons with minority background, and given the uncertainties around 
identities and the differences between census results and estimates, at the elections, however, 
there were understandably difficulties encountered in implementing and enforcing those 
provisions that declared the minorities’ right to establish MSGs and that minority rights could 
be applied only to Hungarian citizens. As a consequence, until the 2005 overall amendment 
every adult Hungarian citizen had the right to vote and be elected at MSGs and non-citizens 
established in Hungary thereby also could vote but they could not be elected. Minority 
elections took place on the same days as local elections.  
The number of MSGs increased from cycle to cycle (from 814 in 1994-1995 to 2,315 in 2010) 
which could be due to growing consciousness on one hand, but to another less favourable 
phenomenon on the other hand. As one result, the number of votes casted was mostly beyond 
even the estimated number of minorities, and that “sympathy-votes” from the majority 
introduced serious distortions in minority public life. In relation to candidates it was even 
more serious and posed a threat for the entire model that such persons tended to be elected, 
too, who presumably or obviously did not belong to that specific community. Since mostly 
local minority representatives elected indirectly the MSGs at capital and national levels those 
could also be affected by abuses.  
In order to reduce the possibility of abuses, pursuant to the 2005 law, only those Hungarian 
citizens had the right to vote who belonged to recognized minorities and declared their 
affiliation by previously registering in minority electoral rolls that were held by the head of 
local electoral offices who, however, had no competence to assess the presence of minority 
belonging. Whereas it simplified the system by reducing the number of local types the 
election of the only remaining form could be held if the number of registered voters of a given 
minority at a municipality reached 30 by the established deadline. The law imposed further 
requirements on minority candidates: only certain minority associations had the right to run 
candidates who were furthermore obliged to state that they knew the native language, 
minority culture and traditions, and were not earlier member of MSG of any other minority. 
Despite the restrictions both the results of the latest elections and repeatedly some local 
scandals raised further doubts that the modification achieved its goal. Taking into account the 
needs of larger minorities the 2005 law created the county-territorial level of MSGs that 
existed only in Budapest before. Regarding their electoral system as well as of national ones 
there was a shift from majoritarian to proportional type in which each minority presents a list 
of candidates and they receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. This three-
level structure has been remained since the new 2011 law on the rights of minorities has come 
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into force but the elections of territorial and national MSGs have become also direct since the 
latest 2014 minority elections.  
3. The Analysis of the Functions of Elections  
The following section aims to review the major key functions of elections as stressed by the 
relevant literature, and in each aspect it addresses the question whether and how these 
requirements can be conceptualized in these special minority contexts and further, it explains 
and illustrates the theoretical problems with some country experiences. Taking the types and 
different levels of elections into account, the crucial questions are that how and to what extent 
the minority elections increased legitimacy and accountability, contributed to the channelling 
of debates, to the creation of effective representative structures, and to the selection of 
representatives and whether they encouraged voter participation, also need to be addressed. 
The analytical point of departure is the well-known and complex condition of “free and fair 
elections” in democratic political settings, referring basically on one hand to the freedom of 
voters that every eligible adult citizen shall have the right to vote and be elected on a non-
discriminatory basis, and on the other hand to the possibility of choice, the competition 
between parties and candidates (Hermet, 1978).  
As to the first, voter dimension, however, this kind of institutional setting almost inevitably 
raises questions and dilemmas, both in theory and in practice, about community boundaries 
(Bauböck, 2001), more precisely who belongs to the given minority and who does not, and, 
secondly, how this should be appraised, whether and how group members have to be defined 
and registered.8 In this regard, the data presented in Table 3 shows that in Hungary, at the 
previous elections, the number of registered minority voters was constantly much below the 
number of those who declared themselves as persons belonging to the officially recognized 
minority communities at the latest censuses and even below their estimated numbers. In 
addition, these data seem to demonstrate that by further modifying and restricting the electoral 
rules especially on the basis of the struggle against ethno-business, the recent Hungarian 
legislation has gone to the other extreme and has a demobilizing effect, even discouraging 
voters from participating at minority elections.    
Table 3: Number of persons belonging to national and ethnic minorities in Hungary at 
the censuses of 2001 and 2011, and the number of registered minority voters at the 2006, 
2010 and 2014 MSG elections and at the 2014 parliamentary elections9 
Minority Minority persons according to 
at least one response out of 
the four census questions 
MSG elections Parliamentary 
elections 
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These are administered either by the minority organizations themselves (Estonia, Slovenia) or by state authorities 
(Croatia, Serbia). To a varying extent, they all take into account the census data concerning the local sizes of 
minority populations. 
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2001 2011 2006 2010 2014 2014 
Bulgarian 2,316 6,272 2,110 2,088 654 104 
Roma 205,720 315,583 106,333 133,492 57,824 14,271 
Greek 6,619 4,642 2,451 2,267 675 140 
Croat 25,730 26,774 11,090 11,571 7,231 1,623 
Polish 5,144 7,001 3,061 3,052 1,148 133 
German 120,344 185,696 45,983 46,629 30,526 15,209 
Armenian 1,165 3,571 2,361 2,357 615 184 
Romanian 14,781 35,641 4,404 5,277 2,350 647 
Ruthene 2,079 3,882 2,729 4,228 1,213 611 
Ukrainian 7,393 7,396 2,143 2,432 840 349 
Serb 7,350 10,038 15,049 12,282 8,248 1,317 
Slovak 39,266 35,208 991 1,025 519 199 
Slovene 4,832 2,820 1,084 1,338 671 502 
 
The second crucial aspect means that by delegating political representation and power from 
voters to representatives in order to make more efficient decisions, the voters shall have the 
option not only to elect but to select their representatives with appropriate skills and with 
whom they share some common views and values. This requirement is based on the 
assumption that voters have the possibility to choose from alternatives, different objectives, 
and various rival candidates and parties. Minority elections, moreover, enable to map the 
power relations in a given community (Kántor, Majtényi, 2004, 18). In this regard, the crucial 
question is whether real competition can be expected at all from the main subjects of the NTA 
regimes, the relatively small and dispersed minority groups being often at an advanced stage 
of linguistic and cultural assimilation? When examining the extent of electoral competition, 
Graph 1 below shows that for instance in 2010, when the number of representatives to be 
elected to a local MSG was four, real choice among different, contending organizations and 
candidates could only be observed in the fairly divided communities, like Roma or 
Romanians.  
Graph 1: the average number of candidates for local MSG elections in Hungary, 2010   
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As to a further and crucial function, it is widely assumed that elected systems of NTA 
increase legitimacy, and provides democratic legitimacy to those elected to power. Although 
it is evident that the formal electoral procedure itself lends some legitimacy to the elected 
bodies (and the need for a legitimate leadership was an important concern in choosing this 
institutional form), ensures the peaceful shift of power, the term ‘legitimacy’ nevertheless 
gains an additional meaning in its application to community legitimacy in the minority 
context. This also relates to how and whether minority constituents perceive their 
representatives as legitimate. Taking into also account that this part of the continent offers 
various cases in which identities and group boundaries are contested and even the small and 
scattered groups perform a high level of internal diversity especially in the context of parallel 
and often rival nation- and state-building projects of the region. The issue of group legitimacy 
was especially striking and significant in the Hungarian case, in which, as noted above, until 
2006, every Hungarian voter had the right to vote and be elected to MSGs, and as a result, on 
one side, the number of votes casted was even above the estimated number of the respective 
number (see Table 4), and on the other side, such persons were also successfully elected who 
obviously or presumably did not belong to the specific group, a phenomenon commonly 
referred as “ethnobusiness” seriously tended to erode the community legitimacy of the 
minority bodies.   
Table 4: the elections of MSGs in Hungary, 1994-2002    
Minority Number of 
MSGs 
elected in 
1994-1995 
Number of 
votes in 
1994 and 
1995 
Number of 
MSGs 
elected in 
1998 
Number of 
votes in 1998 
Number of 
MSGs 
elected in 
2002 
Bulgarian 4 2,882 15 21,998 31 
Roma 477 888,279 768 1,092,044 999 
Bulgari
an
Roma Greek Croat Polish
Germa
n
Armen
ian
Roma
nian
Ruthe
ne
Serb Slovak
Sloven
e
Ukrain
ian
Average 4,31 7,95 5,91 5,04 5,06 5,24 4,69 6,56 5,53 4,7 5,31 4,34 4,39
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
 
Greek 6 10,635 19 61,605 31 
Croat 57 98,005 75 102,956 108 
Polish 7 3,220 33 82,743 51 
German 162 560,620 272 966,324 341 
Armenian 16 32,052 25 72,725 31 
Romanian 11 19,844 33 36,430 44 
Ruthene 1 1,323 10 7,117 32 
Serb 19 37,319 35 34,642 44 
Slovak 51 114,460 76 163,110 115 
Slovene 6 5,660 10 9,558 13 
Ukrainian 0 0 5 6,670 13 
Total 817 1,774,299 1,376 2,657,922 1,853 
 
The function of providing legitimacy is closely related to other aspects such as granting 
control over those elected and since many view representation as an ongoing process of three 
key elements, authorization, representation, and accountability, enforcing political 
accountability, therefore, is also a crucial, yet usually the weakest component of elections. 
Unlike appointed representatives or voluntary organizations, these minority bodies are more 
accountable to the people, thus, they are deemed to be more democratic. Both legitimacy and 
accountability are closely intertwined with the assumption that voters are encouraged and 
required to participate at the elections by casting their votes. The idea is that elections may 
create more accountable, effective, transparent, and potentially more visible organizations that 
have the potential to unite and mobilize communities as much as possible. In practice, 
however, data show decline from one election to another (Graph 2). 
Graph 2: voter turnouts at the elections of MSGs in Hungary, 2006-2010 (%) 
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Voters’ behaviour are certainly influenced by a number of factors, and firstly there is the need 
to assess how electoral systems affect them, to examine how institutions constrain it, with 
special emphasis on the procedures of electoral registration and the perceived efficacy, the 
meaningfulness of voting (voter turnout) as well as on the impact on both large- and small-
party supporters. In all cases, it is also of crucial importance how community leaders, ethnic 
activists, and minority organizations, parties seek mobilize and integrate less committed 
members.       
Last but not least the formulation and main features of the electoral systems, the extent to 
which elections reflect voters’ preferences and patterns of potential internal cleavages, the 
configuration of minority parties, organizations also need to be carefully analysed. It not only 
involves that in case of scattered minority groups, the assessments whether and to what extent 
election results reflect accurately the territorial distribution, but first and foremost the adopted 
electoral formula, majoritarian, proportional or their combination is a serious matter. For 
instance, the majoritarian elections at national level between 1995 and 2006 resulted in highly 
disproportionate minority bodies in which, by the fairly divided communities, such as Roma, 
relatively large segments of the civil society and influential organizations could only gain few 
seats or none at all, as it is demonstrated by the Loosemore-Hanby index10 (Graph 3).   
Graph 3: the elections of certain national MSGs in Hungary, 2003 (Loosemore-Hanby 
index)   
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Since the type of the electoral system is significantly related to the development of party 
systems, there is also a need to evaluate how it affects the parties’ behaviour, how 
proportionality/ disproportionality, competitiveness affect efficacy, voter turnout, how they 
influence the number of competing and elected parties. To analyse whether and how the 
electoral systems force parties to express or aggregate diverse opinions, strengthen partisan 
attachments, offer greater choice, whether they lead to more fragmented party structures and 
electoral results, and whether they benefits more entrenched parties and foster durable 
coalitions.    
4. Conclusions 
The present paper aimed to address and highlight the question of whether and how some of 
the main functions elections can be conceptualized and understood in these special minority 
contexts in Hungary. Concerning the existing elected non-territorial or mixed autonomies of 
Central and South Eastern Europe, very little research has been carried out to explore other 
important and closely intertwined aspects and effects of minority elections, the logic and 
process of candidate selection, the relationship between minority constituents and 
representatives, the impact of the electoral system and voter registration on intra-community 
dimensions and dynamics, while taking into consideration the sensitive nature of the ethnic 
data, the varying levels of assimilation and alienation, and the internal democracy of the 
minority communities. Moreover, there is a significant lack of research data on how the 
electoral system and its incentives shape voting behaviour, on voters’ perceptions of the 
electoral system, on whether it generates a more stable or divided leadership and moderates or 
encourages competition and internal rivalry. Future areas of research also need to address the 
issue of whether proportional electoral systems are more representative and can more 
effectively reduce intra-community rivalries or whether, on the contrary, they foster 
differences among subgroups (Norris, 2004). Overall, these factors have crucial influence on 
both the effective participation as well as on the future prospects of the minority communities.     
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Summary 
Elections are the primary institutional mechanisms that make rulers accountable, and 
therefore, they are major components and necessary conditions to ensure democracy. 
However, electoral systems and rules are far from neutral; all of them have a political or 
social bias. As political institutions, products of the political process, they are often defined as 
a complex set of structuring factors that provides opportunities and creates institutional 
barriers to alternatives. Furthermore, elections play a key role in certain non-territorial 
autonomy (NTA) arrangements, too. In Central and South Eastern Europe, a group of 
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countries, including Estonia, Hungary, and some of the former Yugoslav republics, namely 
Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia, have established a variant whereby registered minority voters 
are granted the right to establish their own representative institutions by direct or indirect 
elections. It is widely assumed that elected systems of NTA increase legitimacy, and may 
result in more accountable, effective, transparent, and potentially more visible organizations 
that have the potential to unite and mobilize communities. While there has been a consensus 
regarding the minimal conditions under which general elections must take place in 
democracies, and both the institutional design and the policy consequences of electoral 
systems have been the dominant focus of comparative research, little is known about the role 
played by NTA elections in intra-community relations of minorities. In addition to their 
importance in providing legitimacy, very little research has been carried out to explore other 
important aspects of minority elections, the logic and process of candidate selection, the 
relationship between minority constituents and representatives, the impact of the electoral 
system and voter registration on intra-community dimensions and dynamics, while taking into 
consideration the sensitive nature of the ethnic data, the varying levels of assimilation and 
alienation, and the internal democracy of the minority communities. To address the issues 
above, the paper seeks to explore both theoretically and in practice, the general patterns of 
elections of the minority self-governments in Hungary, one of most prominent cases of the 
five countries concerned, and aims to contribute to the better understanding of the role of 
elections in minority contexts. In addition, it examines whether and how the main functions of 
elections – freedom of voters, competition, choice from alternatives, legitimacy and 
accountability, mobilization for participation – as well as the main features of the electoral 
system, the adopted electoral formula, can be conceptualized and understood in special 
minority elections. 
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